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FDR, the Rhetoric of Vision, and the Creation of a National Synoptic State
Abstract

Throughout his administration, FDR engaged in a complex set of arguments that worked together
to defend democracy in general as a viable form of government; American democracy as the
highest expression of democratic government; the primacy of the federal government as the most
efficient and effective locus of democratic power; and the executive office as the culmination of
the form, efficiency, and locus of that power. My specific concern here is with one form those
arguments took, the visual metaphors that permeate FDR’s rhetoric. Visuality in FDR’s rhetoric
is especially intriguing because of the way it interacted with the prevailing political culture in
order to underwrite radical shifts in political power by helping FDR persuade the mass public to
accept a synoptic view of nationalism and governmental responsibility. These changes have
implications for presidents, presidential candidates, and for the citizens whose support they seek.
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FDR, the Rhetoric of Vision, and the Creation of a National Synoptic State

We take the size and power of the federal government for granted. Even those who object
most to “federal intervention” in national affairs have trouble locating precise areas in which
they do not want governmental involvement, and have, since Ronald Reagan first issued his call
to “get government off the backs of the American people,” consistently supported legislation
increasing federal power in various aspects of our national life. 1 We take the president’s role in
the federal government for granted as well. It is “the president’s budget,” and “the president’s
agenda,” and while there are debates about the efficacy of presidential efforts to lead public
opinion no one seriously questions the ubiquity of such efforts. 2 While political scientists and
historians situate these changes in the 1930s and 1940s and credit Franklin D. Roosevelt with the
impetus behind them, 3 very little research has been done on the persuasive work that fostered
Roosevelt’s articulation of primacy for U.S. federal government in general and for the person of
the president very much in particular. 4 Those articulations, significant in Roosevelt’s day, remain
important exigencies for presidents and presidential candidates.
At the time of FDR’s ascension to office and throughout his administration, there were
loud and contentious debates about the appropriate forms a modern democratic government
could and should take. 5 These debates concerned the best way to ensure efficiency in the midst
of crisis on the one hand and preserve democracy in the midst of a world that seemed
increasingly prone to militarism, communism, and fascism on the other. 6 In this political context,
FDR engaged in a complex set of arguments that worked together to defend democracy in
general as a viable form of government; American democracy as the highest expression of
democratic government characterized by a specific kind of citizenship; the primacy of the federal
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government as the most efficient and effective locus of democratic power; and the executive
office as the culmination of the form, efficiency, and locus of that power. These arguments
underwrote changes that continue to affect the practices of the chief executive and the rhetoric of
those who aspire to that office. 7
These arguments were defended in a wide variety of ways throughout the Roosevelt
administration. Presidential rhetorical competence has always been an important aspect of
success in the office, 8 but the nature of that expertise changes over time and across media. 9 FDR
was famous in his own day as well as in ours as a master of the press 10 and is widely understood
as the first president to take serious advantage of radio, 11 both of which are often cited as the
reason for his extraordinary relationship with the mass public. 12 There is also evidence that he
made astute use of newsreels. 13 As the nation moved from a reliance on print media to more
visual communication on the one hand and an entirely aural form of communication on the other,
FDR operated at the intersection of these communicative forms. 14 Roosevelt’s communicative
talent is widely acknowledged. 15 He is regarded as a progenitor of press management 16 and as a
rhetor of uncommon skill. 17 His persuasive discourse is often understood as one of the
foundations of his presidency18 if not as the major reason for its success. 19 Roosevelt’s
communicative skill is unquestioned and unquestionably integral to his political success.
My specific concern here is with one way in which that skill was displayed, the visual
metaphors that permeate FDR’s rhetoric, and which, to use Michael Osborn’s terms, set his
argument before his listeners’ eyes, and invited them to see as he saw, to accept his role as their
representative. 20 Davis W. Houck has convincingly demonstrated the importance of Roosevelt’s
visual rhetoric as a mechanism that assisted his efforts to camouflage his disability and attain the
presidency. 21 Houck’s analysis of FDR’s use of bodily and sensate metaphors reveals an
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important function of that rhetoric. Presidential embodiment is, as Houck shows, a rich site of
rhetorical analysis, and his work reveals important insights into the associations between the
president’s body, perceptions of the nation’s political health, and the gendered nature of the
institution of the presidency.
But as Cara Finnegan notes, Roosevelt’s visual rhetoric operated on many levels, 22
including educating the public, providing reassurance, and encouraging mobilization. 23
Certainly, as Finnegan also observes, this language “echoes a larger cultural shift in Depressionera modes of knowledge and representation,” 24 reflecting the era’s conflation of “seeing” and
“knowing.” Her work concentrates on the cultural shifts revealed and enabled by this conflation,
which pointed to “visual remedies” for the nation’s ills.25 For Finnegan, a documentary form of
seeing led credence to specific forms of representation and supported certain kinds of policies.
Building on those insights, I am interested here in the institutional remedies whose warrants were
frequently framed in visual language, namely, the shift in political power from the state and local
governments to the national government, and within the federal system from congressional to
presidential centrality.
The persuasive work associated with these shifts was extensive and encompassed nonvisual as well as visual language. But ocular metaphors were particularly useful for they
resonated with the era’s cultural emphasis on authenticity and helped render much that was
unfamiliar more proximate. 26 Visuality in FDR’s rhetoric is especially intriguing because of the
way it interacted with the prevailing political culture in order to underwrite radical shifts in
political power by helping FDR persuade the mass public to accept a synoptic view of
nationalism and governmental responsibility. 27 These changes organized government and
citizenship in particular ways. In order to facilitate national planning and a national program,
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Roosevelt had to develop a national vision. In James C. Scott’s terms, he had to see like a state. 28
But he also had to encourage the nation to participate in this new way of understanding
politics. 29 In so doing, he fundamentally changed the nature of the federal government and its
relationship to the national citizenry.
My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly discuss the national crisis that
provided both the context and much of the impetus for Roosevelt’s political actions. I then turn
to the political shifts that occurred during the Roosevelt years and to the visual language that
helped accomplish the persuasive work authorizing those shifts. I conclude with a discussion of
the consequences of the Rooseveltian revolution and the synoptic state it engendered.
Democracy in Crisis
As the world depression deepened in the early 1930s, it was no wonder that governments
teetered and collapsed. 30 By 1933, national unemployment in the United States ranged
somewhere between 25 and 37 percent, depending on how the data were calculated. 31 In some
places, it hovered at around 80 percent. 32 Business investment was 90 percent lower than it had
been a mere four years previously. 33 In the same period, the American Gross National Product
fell by 30 percent while farm prices fell by twice that number and industrial production was
halved. 34 On a more human level, the suicide rate rose dramatically 35 while homes were being
lost at the rate of a thousand a day, throwing families into the streets and overwhelming what
little sources of relief states and localities were able to provide. 36 According to Secretary of the
Interior Harold Ickes, upon whom much of the administration of relief would fall, “Millions of
people were half fed . . .barely clothed . . .and living more like kennelless dogs than human
beings.” 37 The poverty and dislocations caused by the economic cataclysm—physical, social,
economic, and psychological—cannot be imagined by those of us who did not experience them
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directly. Those who were there searched for comparisons through which they could make the
disaster intelligible. When asked if he’d knew of anything comparable to the Depression, for
instance, economist John Maynard Keynes replied affirmatively, adding, “it was called the Dark
Ages, and it lasted four hundred years.” 38 Prevailing theories of government and economics were
all but entirely discredited and the way forward was unclear at best. 39
In this context, it was doubtful that the traditional forms of government could or should
be saved. 40As “radio priest” Father Charles E. Coughlin put it in 1934, “Truly, democracy itself
is on trial.” 41 Challenges to traditional structures pervaded popular culture, up to and including
arguments for dictatorship. 42 Such calls were associated not only with Roosevelt as a personality
but also with an increasing fear that without dictatorial powers in the hands of a strong executive,
order would be impossible. These fears were exacerbated by continuing threats to that order. In
1934 alone, for instance, 1.4 million workers went on strike, 43 and there were widespread
indications that people were rapidly losing their respect for and fear of the law. 44 Interestingly,
the response to the economic disaster was not always expressed as violence or panic, but often as
depression, alienation, resignation, despair, and as individual failure and self-blame. 45 The entire
nation felt these consequences directly or indirectly as all the old verities and the hierarchies
associated with them crumbled.
Events abroad were equally disconcerting. Hitler’s rise paralleled Roosevelt’s own, and
Japan’s increased militarism created very real concern about the repercussions for American
interests in Asia. 46 The United States, isolated and prosperous throughout the 1920s, retained its
isolationism if not its prosperity throughout the 1930s, but as the decade progressed citizens
became increasingly agitated by the fear that events abroad would impel the nation into another
cataclysmic war. 47
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Roosevelt’s election in 1932 may have provided hope, at least on the domestic front, but
it solved nothing. FDR campaigned on a promise to initiate “bold, persistent experimentation,” 48
in addressing the national economic crisis. But the Depression, punctuated by mild bouts of
recovery, continued into the early 1940s. International tensions ebbed and flowed throughout the
period, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the bloodbath of world war. 49 While
Roosevelt responded to these events by attempting to modernize and reorganize what passed for
the American state, he met considerable resistance. His goal was to centralize political
administration, to make it more efficient, more amenable to wide scale planning; in a word, to
render American politics more synoptic. Throughout his entire time in office FDR argued that
democracy was viable, especially in the United States, which nurtured a certain kind of citizen,
and that the best hope of preserving democracy was a strong national government headed by a
strong president. These arguments were often made in language that evoked the visual.
Roosevelt’s Synoptic State
To address the unprecedented national crisis, Americans were willing to endorse
sweeping changes, especially in the initial days of FDR’s first term, including grants of
extraordinary power to the national government and to its chief executive. Importantly, the scope
of these changes, if not their consequences, was clearly understood at the time. 50 FDR’s plans
thus had to be defended publicly and often, for serious danger lay in the issue of how the
acquisition of power would be read in a global context that included the American fear of the
Soviet Union and the rise to power of dictators in Germany and Italy. 51 In the face of challenges
to the viability of democracy posed by the economic crisis and these dictators, Roosevelt argued
that he was committed to both preserving and modernizing the forms of democratic governance
in the United States. 52 Visual language was integral to this effort.
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In many ways, national government requires that the nation be rendered visible. 53
Importantly, the imperatives behind this requirement are market-driven; increased national
rationalism is connected to increased national productivity and access to markets. 54 Rationalism
is attained through making the nation visible and thus amenable to hierarchical ordering. In this
process, its multitude of disparate elements must be abstracted, ordered, rendered legible. This
legibility implies a central position from which the nation can be seen, understood, and managed,
so national government and administration are required. This was a difficult challenge for
Americans to meet in the 1930s, for as many scholars have noted, there is a problematic
relationship between visuality and democracy. 55 Citizens want to be able to see their leaders and
they want those leaders’ actions to be transparent in ways that directly contrast to a monarchy’s
reliance on ritual. 56 Democratic display needs to be more symbolically oriented toward
accountability than toward spectacle, 57 a need that reflects belief in a specific kind of audience,
one that is attentive, witnessing, and capable of rational deliberation, even while organization on
a mass scale works to reduce the importance of any singular individual. 58 The state must be seen
even as it makes the nation visible and the processes of accomplishing this must be understood as
transparent if they are also to be understood as democratic. 59 In making this transition to a
synoptic state, Roosevelt’s first step was to argue that democracy was not only a viable but also
an intrinsically superior form of government.
“I Paint it For You in Hope” 60: The Viability of Democracy
Despite the widespread belief that the Depression provided inescapable evidence that
democracy could not survive, 61 Roosevelt argued that it remained viable and was, indeed, the
system of government most likely to return the world to economic stability, revealing the close
relationship presidents have always fostered between economic capitalism and political
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democracy. For Roosevelt, democracy was not only the truest expression of the best of human
nature but also the system most likely to ensure that its citizens were productive and prosperous
as well as happy. 62 In 1934, for example, he vividly depicted the days before his election:
Individuals were seeking quick riches at the expense of other individuals. Geographical
sections were seeking economic preference for themselves to the disadvantage of other
sections. Cities were recklessly offering inducements to manufacturing plants to move
away from other cities. Within given industries unfair competition went on unheeded or
resulted in vast consolidations whose securities were peddled to the public at dishonest
prices. There was little consideration for the social point of view, and no planning
whatsoever to avoid the pitfalls of overproduction or of selling methods which foisted
articles on a gullible public, which the family budget could not afford. 63
Blame for the economic crisis was specifically located in a poor use of vision. Roosevelt
argued here that he understood the causes of the national calamity (unwise searching) and where
to affix the blame for it. This is consistent with his tendency, as Thomas Farrell notes, to put
malevolence in the past, as already remedied. Consequently, while blame was clearly fixed,
punishment was also not required. 64 In this depiction, the “gullible” mass of citizens were
described as victims of ignorant and unscrupulous business practices and of a government that
had not cared enough to intervene. Under his administration, Roosevelt argued, ignorance was
being corrected, business practices were being reformed, and government was instituting a better
way of seeing, a “social point of view.” This perspective required planning to achieve the results
it promised. Democratic capitalism as a system was, in this depiction, sound; its ill were
correctable and were being corrected. All that was required for this correction was an
endorsement of Roosevelt’s government which embodied “the social point of view.”
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Democracy, according to FDR was the form of government most able to instantiate this
perspective. Roosevelt thus urged reform rather than revolution. In his first inaugural, more
noted for his willingness to assume extraordinary power than for his reliance on American
traditions of limited government, he said, “Action in this image and to this end is feasible under
the form of government which we have inherited from our ancestors. Our Constitution is so
simple and so practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.” 65 Roosevelt thus argued that nothing
drastic needed to happen to existing structures in order to produce drastic results. This is the
rhetoric of purification, 66 not revolution: “It is our task to perfect, to improve, to alter when
necessary, but in all cases to go forward.” 67 FDR prized movement and activity; for him
stagnation was political death. 68 But, he argued, he did not intend to make changes to the
fundamentals. He was only interested in changing them enough to bring them in line with the
modern world. 69
FDR seems to have assumed that any necessary economic reforms would be produced
indirectly through a modernized political system that focused on the provision of social justice,
represented as light rather than opposing darkness: “These dark days will be worth all they cost
us,” he said in his first inaugural, “if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered
unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men.” 70 The task of government under FDR
was to facilitate the New Deal ministry. 71
That ministry was based on a Christianized view of government responsibilities, which
included a major emphasis on the idea of social justice through improved government. For
Roosevelt, democracy, religion, 72 and civilization were all intimately connected. He could not
envision any one of these without the others. Under his administration, citizens saw the nation in
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the same terms. One correspondent told the president that, “I believe the old age pensions, aid for
crippled children and unemployment insurance are essential to a human and civilized society, to
say nothing of a supposedly Christian nation.” 73 Others complained that New Deal programs
(especially repeal of Prohibition) were “running rough shod over the teaching of Christianity.” 74
In both these cases, and in others like them, the expectation was that the nation would be
governed in ways that were congruent with “Christian” theology.
Roosevelt encouraged the nation to understand world history as an upward trajectory in
which human rights and individual freedom were increasingly realized. “With every passing
year,” he said, “I become more confident that humanity is moving forward to the practical
application of the teachings of Christianity as they affect the individual lives of men and women
everywhere.” 75 Relying here as in so much of his public speech, on values and images associated
with mainstream Christianity, he explicitly applied Christian teleology to political life. 76 An
example from 1938 encapsulates much of this tendency: “Clearer every day is the one great
lesson of history—the lesson taught by the Master of Galilee—that the only road to peace and
the only road to a happier and better civilization is the road to unity—the road called the
‘Highway of Fellowship.’ But as the community of interest becomes apparent to those who live
on farm and in city, the strategy of the cold-blooded few to divide and conquer, to make common
men blind to their common interests, becomes more active.” 77 This glorious compendium of
mixed metaphors rests on a visual foundation. Not only did the vision increasingly available to
the mass of Americans through FDR pose a threat to those he characterized as “the cold-blooded
few,” but that in turn opened up a new clarity of vision for them, who were able to perceive the
exact nature of the threat and move to counter it. The more clearly “the cold-blooded few” saw,
the more determined they became to darken the vision of the rest of the nation. Those who could
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not see clearly were so deluded that they would attempt to delude others. Roosevelt, like the
“Master of Galilee,” could see the correct road, the road that led to a “happier and better
civilization.” Because of this clarity of vision, he was able to unmask the machinations of his
Republican opposition. FDR thus identified vision as the site of struggle; the contest was not
over citizens’ “hearts and minds” in today’s tired parlance, but over their eyes, for the proper
mode of seeing was the condition for victory in the political struggle.
Calling on the rhetorical traditions of western civilization, clear sightedness was equated
with clear thinking in the Rooseveltian vocabulary. Thus, both foreign and domestic threats were
portrayed as “shadows” 78 or in metaphors that conjured darkness or in one way or another
obscured vision. He spoke of “clouds of suspicion,” 79 and of “menacing clouds,” 80 of a potential
“black out of peace,” 81 of “nations without light,” 82 and of his determination that “we will never
permit, if we can help it, the light to grow dim.” 83 Preserving the light required consciously
avoiding deception. In 1940, for instance, in a message asking for increased defense
appropriations, he said, “Let us examine, without self-deception, the dangers which confront us.
Let us measure our strength and our defense without self-delusion.” 84 For Roosevelt, illusions,
deceptions, and lies were all elements that created darkness; collectively, American citizens
would arrive at an accurate picture in the light of reality. “It is not in despair that I paint you this
picture,” he said in his second inaugural. “I paint it for you in hope—because the Nation, seeing
and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out.” 85 Roosevelt equated vision,
understanding, compassion, and national unity, all of which were critical elements in his
invitation to participate in a national synoptic state. There is abundant evidence that citizens
accepted this invitation: In late 1935, for instance, Roosevelt sent letters to the national clergy
asking for reports on local conditions and opinions. Some 7,000 clergymen replied. Both his
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critics and his supporters included information about the smallest of local details and related
those details directly to the need for the president to understand local conditions in order to make
wise and compassionate national policy. 86
It is clear, then, that Roosevelt argued with some effect in response to both internal and
external challenges that democracy was not only viable but was the system most in keeping with
human development. Democracy stood opposed to oppressive regimes such as Communism and
Fascism, and, once its structures were modernized, it would return to its former goals and
provide economic prosperity and social justice. He justified this faith in democracy as a system
through the example of its enactment in the United States, which for Roosevelt, served as the
exemplar of world democracy. In this vision, citizens held a central place.
“Widen the Orbit of Vision” 87: Citizenship in the Synoptic State
Because of this faith in the teleology of democracy, Roosevelt argued that the American
people collectively had vision, and as president, he served that vision: “As the humble
instruments of their vision and their power, those of us who were chosen to serve them in 1932
turned to the great task,” 88 he told a Wisconsin audience in 1934. Because of the clarity and
perspective his office provided, he could see what the mass of Americans saw—but he could see
it more clearly than they. Their vision was individual; his task was to perceive, collate, and enact
that vision into a singular national vision. He was the agent of the people, the instrument of their
will, but as that agent, he had a unique perspective because he could see the whole while others
were limited in their vision to a part of that whole. He thus mobilized visual language as a way of
defining synoptic citizenship.
The people’s vision was informed by the national government and also informed that
government’s larger vision. Ocular citizenship was also therefore inherently democratic. FDR

14

argued in 1940 that “the crash of swiftly moving events over the earth has made us all think with
a longer view.” 89 He encouraged his audience to “look ahead and see” the consequences of the
burgeoning war, and said, “Summing up this need of looking ahead, and in words of common
sense and good American citizenship, I hope that we shall have fewer American ostriches in our
midst. It is not good for the ultimate health of ostriches to bury their heads in the sand.” 90 He
opposed those at home and abroad who were willfully narrow in their outlook—the capitalists
who opposed the New Deal, the isolationists who opposed American intervention in the
European war, and the Fascists who opposed democracy were united in their inability to see
beyond the selfish needs of the moment. Democratic citizens in a synoptic state, on the other
hand, were characterized by their ability to see clearly, to take the “longer view.”
By virtue of their position, presidents had a specific sort of responsibility vis-à-vis
individual citizens: “For a President especially it is a duty to think in national terms. He must
think not only of this year but of future years when someone else will be President. He must look
beyond the average of the prosperity and well-being of the country, for averages can cover up
danger spots or poverty and instability.” 91 The president’s job was to look beyond, to see farther
and more deeply than anyone else, to survey the entire nation and to act on the shared national
vision. Poorly perceived nationalism was dangerous, for averages were potentially deceptive.
Only a clear-sighted nationalism, firmly grounded in democratic norms, would be able to
perceive and act upon true national needs. It was a bottom up vision that found expression from
the top down, as supporters found themselves seeing “eye to eye” with the president. 92
Not everyone agreed with the president’s vision. One of the president’s critics noted, for
example, that those “who try to think clearly and are far-seeing” are and “always will be in the
minority.” 93 Another critic accused him of “shadow boxing with realities.” 94 Regardless of
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partisan affiliation, the political argument was often couched in visual terms. A number of
citizens writing to Roosevelt, for example, often commented on the clarity of his vision. 95 They
also wanted him to see as they saw. They sent him postcards, church bulletins, pictures of all
kinds so that he could see and thus understand local conditions and consequently make better
national policy. 96 His critics also responded with sometimes scathing comments on local
conditions. 97 In all these cases, citizens were working to create a shared national vision by trying
to influence the president’s perception of the nation. 98 Citizenship required sharing vernacular
visions with national actors, for only a national government could see and thus govern the entire
nation.
“The Whole Picture” 99: Federal Primacy
Roosevelt took office with a mandate for “undelayed action,” 100 and for him that meant
federal action. While FDR receives most of the credit for the barrage of legislation that was the
Hundred Days, it is also true that during those days he encouraged congressional initiatives, a
fact that may well explain his very productive and generally cooperative relationship with his
first Congress. 101 Members of the public soon learned to look to the federal government for help,
and this fact alone wrought enormous changes in the relationship between the people and their
government. 102 It was not uncommon for citizens to tell FDR that, “Only the Federal
Government can put a stop to such abuses.” 103 Halford R. Ryan argued that “First, the political
and philosophical theses of FDR’s New Deal rhetoric were that the presidency and Congress had
the legal power and the political obligation to address a national Depression at the national level
with national legislation.” 104 This is critical to understanding Roosevelt’s defense of federal
primacy because a central tenet of that defense was the claim that, “We have undertaken a new
order of things: yet we progress to it under the framework and in the spirit and intent of the

16

American Constitution.” 105 Roosevelt was continually defending the legalities of his moves
under the Constitution, defenses that would not have been needed if the moves had been less
controversial.
One way he managed these controversies was by manipulating images in a form of
antithesis. Roosevelt often placed images in proximity to one another, inviting audiences to “see”
the differences between them. He was especially fond of images relating to size, enabling him to
reduce complicated ideas and sprawling policies to manageable dimensions. He was also able to
reduce the significance of his opponents by rendering them into “small minorities” with “petty
concerns” who needed to be stopped from wielding large and thus disproportionate power. 106
These people were consistently placed in opposition not just to FDR, but also to the “vast
majority” of Americans who agreed with him on whatever policy was under discussion. 107 By
manipulating size, FDR also evoked the audience’s visual acuity: big things became small and
small things became big. It was common for him to assert that, “There are, of course, men, a few
men, who might thwart this great common purpose by seeking selfish advantage.” 108 His
majorities were rarely just majorities—they tended to be “overwhelming,” 109 just as the groups
who opposed him were generally “small.” 110 This manipulation of size—big majorities who
were relatively powerless facing small minorities who had disproportionately large power—had
both political effects, in that it encouraged national unity, and potentially disorienting effects, in
that it called for a change in one’s understanding of reality through a sensual experience of
altered size and proportion. 111
This is better understood as antithesis than as amplification and reduction because the
rhetorical power doesn’t come primarily from the manipulation of size alone but from the
immediate juxtaposition of different sizes of things. That is, Roosevelt did not just sometimes
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refer to his opponents as small and at other times as his supporters as large; these two
characterizations almost always appeared together. In addition, small groups were often depicted
as having large amounts of power, and also as making small problems or issues appear larger
than they in fact were. 112 In his fourth Fireside Chat, for instance, he said,
Because in every step which your Government is taking we are thinking in terms of the
average of you—in the old words “the greatest good for the greatest number”—we, as
reasonable people, cannot expect to bring definite benefits to every person or to every
occupation or business, or industry or agriculture. In the same way no reasonable person
can expect that in this short space of time, during which new machinery had to be not
only put to work, but first set up, that every locality in every one of the forty-eight States
of the country, could share equally and simultaneously in the trend to better times. The
whole picture, however—the average of the whole territory from coast to coast—the
average of the whole population of 120,000,000 people—shows to any person willing to
look, facts and action of which you and I can be proud. 113
Notice how he manipulated size via companion terms throughout this passage. The
federal government was positioned as able to see and thus to understand the entire nation, from
its largest incarnations to its smallest details. He began with “every step,” and a concern for “the
average,” followed by “the greatest number,” who needed “definite benefits” for “every person
or to every occupation or business,” a single “reasonable person,” “every locality in every one of
the forty-eight states,” “The whole picture,” “the average of the whole territory” and “the
average of the whole population,” and concluded with “any person.” The swelling and reduction
of the nouns in this one brief passage is downright vertiginous. This dislocation allows for
relocation—distance was reduced and propinquity established. The distances between his
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auditors and between his auditors and himself were bridged and the audience invited to see as
FDR saw, to participate through him in an embodied politics in which he represented the shared
perspective of the audience. 114
Importantly, this passage both depicts the entire nation and rests on a visual metaphor.
The national government was positioned as having unique access to the “whole picture,” and as
able to elucidate it to “any person willing to look.” The task of the national government was to
apprehend the national “picture,” and the task of the citizen was to be “willing to look” at that
picture as it was explained to them by the president—who assumed interpretive authority over
the nation.
“He Must Look Beyond” 115: Presidential Centrality
Unlike the shift from a local to a national policy orientation, the establishment of
presidential political dominance implied personal as well as institutional power. This connection
caused Roosevelt enormous difficulties, for it was here that the allegations of dictatorship
resonated most deeply. 116 There was simply no denying that his leadership was indeed strongly
centered in the person and personality of the president. In part, this was probably an artifact of
his medium of communication. 117 But in part, it was also an artifact of Roosevelt’s rhetoric and
the ways it resonated with the public. For example, one minister replied to the president’s request
for information about local conditions and needs by asking for farm equipment. “A single
tractor,” he noted, “properly placed, could do much to take care of many garden plots and the
expense would be trifling.” 118 This clergyman felt able to ask the president to satisfy a purely
local need. In another example, a bishop told the president that, “You have tried to build a bridge
between the dim visions of unhappy, restless men and women, and the victorious realization of
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those visions.” 119 For these correspondents, vision and the reduction of distance were related, if
in ways that seem grammatically obscure.
This linkage was crucial, because both the reduction of distance and the personal trust
engendered by this rhetorical intimacy were powerful elements authorizing the shift in
institutional power. William H. Watts, for example, wrote to the president, “I have thought all
along that you, Mr. President, and the men of undoubted integrity to whom you have entrusted
the carrying out of your plans know best what ought to be done and the best way to do it.” 120
Citizens like Watts “recognized” FDR’s superior vantage point and authorized action in keeping
with that superiority.
Roosevelt consistently claimed that while democracy was viable and that in the United
States it found its clearest and most vibrant expression, the previous decade had corrupted the
system, thus requiring restorative action. That action could only be effective if it was carried out
by a national synoptic state. “In the White House today,” he said in 1940, “we have built up a
great mosaic of the state of the union from thousands of bits of information—from one man or
woman this thought; from another, data on some event; a scrap here perhaps and a scrap there;
from every Congressional district in the Union and from rich and poor; from enthusiast and
complainant; from liberal and conservative; from Republican and Democrat.” 121 Here Roosevelt
portrayed himself as an artist crafting a mosaic from tiny bits of unrelated materials. Only he
could see the whole before the mosaic was completed; his internal vision determined the final
shape. He was both the instrument of the people and the guiding hand of national unity. As an
agent his was the task of ordering and disciplining the visual in the service of national goals. But
as the agent, he had a perspective on those goals no one else could match.
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The president was not only graced with a certain perspective but also obligated to act
upon it. He said, “Nevertheless, as the Executive head of Government, I am compelled to look
facts in the face.” 122 The ethotic element of this visual language allowed him to argue for his
definitions as the correct definitions; they were not a matter of contention, but were “recognized”
truths. His perspective ultimately trumped that of anyone else. 123 In arguing for the dominance of
his perspective he was also implicitly arguing for the dominance of the executive over the
legislative branch at the national level and for the national government over those of localities as
well. If perspective was the determining force of solid public policy, power should follow it. But
perspective wasn’t the only visual element supporting Roosevelt’s claim to authority. He could
not only see farther than others, he could also see more clearly.
If a national perspective gave the president the obligation to assume power over the more
limited perspectives of local governments and the national legislature, his clarity of vision gave
him the obligation to outline the details of policy aimed at the national situation. Roosevelt
consistently declared that things were “evident,” or “clear.” He constantly dispelled “illusions”
and often claimed that we could not afford to be “blinded” by erroneous claims, dreams, or other
misapprehensions 124 and facilitated a shared national vision. 125
That shared national vision was remarkably intimate. Through his use of depiction, FDR
combined form and content to legitimate his claim to see for and thus to act for his national
constituency. 126 The intimacy he thus established is one of the hallmarks of his
communication 127 and correspondents sometimes addressed him as “Frank,” or referred to him in
familial or other kinds of familiar ways. 128 One of the best examples of such depiction is his
1944 Christmas Eve Address to the nation:
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The Christmas spirit lives tonight in the bitter cold of the front lines in Europe and in the
heat of the jungles and swamps of Burma and the Pacific islands. Even the roar of our
bombers and fighters in the air and the guns of our ships at sea will not drown out the
messages of Christmas which come to the hearts of our fighting men. The thoughts of
these men tonight will turn to us here at home around our Christmas trees, surrounded by
our children and grandchildren and their Christmas stockings and gifts—just as our own
thoughts go out to them, tonight and every night, in their distant places. 129
Here Roosevelt evoked both theaters of the war and the home front with equal power and with
equal import. He invited the troops abroad to see Christmas at home even as those at home were
asked to see the experience of the troops. 130 Audiences were prompted not only to feel the
meaning of Christmas but also to picture this idealized view of how the holiday appeared across
the nation and across the world. By enabling emotional connections among his auditors through
depiction, FDR established himself as the crucial link between those auditors and between them
and the government, for he could see—and thus facilitate his audiences’ vision—the entire
picture. The nation had become synoptically unified. 131
Roosevelt’s Vision
It cannot be a coincidence that FDR, who communicated so frequently over radio, used
such a preponderance of visual cues. In an era when visuality was integral to the national
experience, visual language, as Cara Finnegan notes, would have resonated both widely and
deeply. 132 This resonance surely assisted Roosevelt’s efforts to mask his disability. 133 But it had
other consequences as well. Roosevelt didn’t simply encourage his listeners to see. He
encouraged them to see as he saw, with the same clarity he brought to national and international
issues, and with the same long-range vision that enabled action aimed at the future as well as the

22

present. Such rhetoric, spoken so consistently for such a long time, helped establish his deep and
intimate relationship with the American public for it brought them into his realm of experience
even as he seemed to participate in theirs. William Gorham Rice, for instance, wrote the
president on that, “What you said in your speech last night is exactly what our citizens needed to
hear from one who is constantly surveying the situation,” indicating that FDR had made his
experience clear to at least one member of his audience. 134 Another correspondent noted that his
speeches made him feel “very near.” 135 There is no doubt that citizens felt closely connected to
this president in a way that has few, if any, parallels.
During FDR’s administration the public attitude toward the federal government changed
and the vehicle for that change was the person of the president himself. Famously, the biggest
ovation he received during his first inaugural was after his assertion that he would not hesitate to
assume wartime power, a particularly chilling thought given the fervent isolationism of the
period and the rise of dictators abroad. 136 Members of the mass public felt connected to him and
to his wife. They wrote to him in numbers that seem incredible. 137 The White House received
between 5,000 and 8,000 letters a day. 138 They equated him with both Jesus and Moses. 139 They
hung his portrait in their homes. 140 The lines that accompanied his funeral train from Georgia to
Washington remain legendary. 141And they hated him with an intensity and venom that in itself
was indicative of how personal and personalized his governance had become. 142
Roosevelt worked hard to create and maintain the personal aspect of his power. He
wooed the press, set very specific rules for his press conferences and he increased the number of
staffers dedicated to news management by over 300 percent. 143 He began his Fireside Chats with
the homey greeting, “My friends,” and he did not hesitate to reach out to every audience in ways
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that tied the public’s allegiance to him as much as to the government he led. And, importantly for
my argument, his rhetoric created a participatory experience for listeners. 144
That experience was instrumental to his overall task of encouraging the country to think,
believe, and act as a nation; moving the center of political life from localities and states to the
federal level; shifting the weight of power and influence over policy thus nationalized from the
Congress to the Executive; and basing all of this on mediated communication that allowed the
president to establish and maintain a “personal” relationship with the mass public. All of these
were facilitated by Roosevelt’s ability to enable his audience to visualize the nation as a whole
and to participate in that vision.
That participation allowed FDR to organize the task of building an American state based
upon the collection, abstraction and management of various localities. Under Roosevelt, politics,
economics, and popular culture became more “mass” than vernacular. Nation building was
accompanied by serious economic, political, and social dislocations. Many of these were both
facilitated and masked by rhetoric relying on visuality and relying on claims to a shared national
perspective. That rhetoric constituted a unified public with a clear vision of the national future. It
excluded from that public those who did not share the president’s vision.
He structured politics around group interests and opened the floodgates of lobbying. 145
He opened Washington’s doors to group pressure and managed those pressures himself through
an artful and devious personalized system of policymaking. Centralized government exploded
under his administration, leaving a legacy of governmental edifices strewn throughout the capital
city and along its famous Mall and a bewildering structure of competing, overlapping, and
contending departments and agencies.
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He brought mass media and the presidency together in ways that the nation had never
seen before, 146 and his style of personalized and personal politics, which worked so well for him,
have had important consequences for the political system. As biographer James MacGregor
Burns noted, “He took the role of national father, of bipartisan leader, of President of all the
people. Playing this role with consummate skill, he extracted from it the last morsel of political
power and government action.” 147 His successors, less endowed with Roosevelt’s skill, have
nonetheless continued to play the roles Roosevelt created, and have increasingly aggrandized the
office and raised our expectations concerning those who occupy it. This legacy permeates the
language of modern presidential campaigns and these developments remain enormously
consequential in the practice of contemporary politics.
FDR’s rhetoric authorized one hegemonic view of national life, displaced local
experiences of the nation, helped to legitimate a strong federal government and the rather
paternalistic role of the chief executive within that government. It did these things while
rendering its own hierarchies and exclusions invisible. It is important to note too, that this
experience was not actually participatory. Even as citizens were feeling more strongly connected
to the president, he was, in fact, further removed from them. Fewer people actually had direct
access to the chief executive and as policy making became more bureaucratized and more
national, there was less individual influence on policy that more directly impacted increasing
numbers of people. 148 Roosevelt argued consistently that sharing his vision, seeing through his
eyes, enabled the protection of the vernacular on the national level and that the synoptic state
was consistent with republican norms and democratic practices. But it is not so easy to reconcile
democratic citizenship with a strong centralized state and a strong executive, for whenever the
local is subsumed into the national, individuation is inevitably lost. The more politics moved to
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the national level, the more citizens were distanced from those politics and the harder presidents
and presidential candidates must work to establish a “personal” connection to the mass public.
These tensions, created during the Roosevelt era, continue to characterize our national politics,
creating also a central set of issues for those who wish to understand the presidency, national
citizenship, and the ways in which they influence one another.
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